Violence in Mexico has shaped the trajectory of the country for nearly two decades. What began in 2006 as a military intervention has evolved into the foundation of Mexico’s security strategy, sustained across administrations. Today, with updated homicide-rate data and a new administration under President Claudia Sheinbaum, Mexico faces a pivotal question: What kind of security model will define the next decade, and what will this mean for institutional strength, democracy, and regional cooperation?
Mexico Homicide Rates (2006–2024)
Since Mexico declared its war against the drug trade in 2006, the nation’s population has grown by more than 23 million people. Over the same period, homicide rates followed a distinct trajectory.
Using INEGI homicide totals and United Nations mid-year population estimates, the pattern is clear:
- 2006: ~10 homicides per 100,000
- 2011 peak: ~24 per 100,000
- 2018–2020 peak: ~29 per 100,000
- 2024: ~26 per 100,000
The key insight is not just the rise, but the plateau. After 2020, violence stabilized at historically high levels. Mexico has not returned to its pre-2006 levels of security, but neither is it trapped in an unending upward spiral.
This stabilization, however, does not necessarily reflect improved governance. In some areas, it reflects the consolidation of criminal groups rather than the strengthening of state institutions.
To understand how Mexico reached this point of stabilized but elevated violence, it is necessary to examine how successive administrations shaped the country’s security strategy.
Felipe Calderón and the Militarization of Mexico’s Security Strategy
In 2006, President Felipe Calderón deployed the armed forces against drug cartels in what became known as the “kingpin strategy” (Grayson, 2012). With financial and military assistance from the United States, Mexican forces managed to capture or kill twenty-five of the top kingpins in the country (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024).
While Calderón framed the strategy as an emergency response, it produced long-lasting structural effects. Critics claim the kingpin strategy weakened large organizations without addressing underlying issues such as corruption, collusion, impunity, and a lack of economic opportunities. Large cartels fragmented into smaller, more violent groups, reaching more than 200 by 2020, according to some estimates. These groups began to compete more fiercely for territory, sweeping many into their battles, which contributed to the rise in homicide rates over the past two decades. By the end of Calderon’s term, official statistics showed more than 70,000 organized crime-related deaths (Sosa, 2025).
Likewise, this tactic normalized military involvement in roles traditionally delegated to state and local police. Thus, what began as a temporary measure became the new foundation of national security.
Enrique Peña Nieto: Continuity in Mexico’s Security Policy
Rather than reversing this militarized foundation, subsequent administrations adjusted the rhetoric while preserving the structure.
Enrique Peña Nieto shifted the rhetoric from “war” to “policy of state,” emphasizing prevention and coordination. However, little changed at the structural level. The military remained central to public security, federal police capacities stagnated, extortion and fuel theft surged, and homicide rates reached record highs by 2018.
From the outset, critics noted the absence of a clear diagnosis of organized crime, the persistence of territorial control by criminal groups, and the continued reliance on military forces due to weak state and municipal policing (Ramírez, 2012). Conceived as a hybrid force, the proposed Gendarmería Nacional foreshadowed later institutional arrangements, reinforcing rather than dismantling militarization. In practice, Peña Nieto’s strategy softened the security narrative without altering its foundations.
López Obrador and the Expansion of the National Guard in Mexico
Andrés Manuel López Obrador entered office promising a paradigm shift. Rejecting what he called the “failed war strategy” of previous administrations, he framed his approach as abrazos, no balazos—”hugs, not bullets” (Ramales Osorio, García Jiménez y Pérez Salmorán, 2025). The slogan suggested a turn toward social policy, prevention, and poverty reduction as tools of security. However, the institutional trajectory of his administration moved in the opposite direction. Rather than dismantling militarization, it deepened and normalized it.
The defining institutional change in Mexico’s security strategy under López Obrador was the creation of the National Guard in 2019. While proposed as civilian, it ultimately operated under military command (Hernández & Romero-Arias, 2019). By 2022, Congress moved to shift control of the National Guard to the Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA). After some setbacks, this move became official by the end of Lopez Obrador’s administration in 2024, thereby solidifying its military identity (Oropeza Fabián, 2025). The armed forces expanded their roles to ports, customs, infrastructure, and social program logistics, gaining unprecedented influence in governance.
Homicide rates declined modestly during López Obrador’s term, from approximately 29 per 100,000 to about 26 by 2024 (INEGI, 2025). However, the reasons behind this reduction are disputed.
Two decades of research show that militarization has not resolved structural weaknesses such as impunity or institutional fragility. Studies tracking public security policy over two decades find that militarization has correlated with ongoing violence and human rights concerns rather than clear improvements in governance outcomes (Gaussens & González, 2020). Analyses of lethal violence also emphasize the role of cartel dynamics, including cyclical fragmentation and competition among criminal groups, as shaping homicide patterns independently of formal policy shifts (Flores Martínez & Phillips, 2022).
By the end of López Obrador’s presidency, militarization was no longer an emergency measure but an institutionalized pillar of Mexico’s security strategy.
Claudia Sheinbaum’s Security Policy and Mexico’s Security Strategy
Sheinbaum faces a security crisis within an institutional framework shaped by two decades of militarization. The key question is whether she will reform this approach or reinforce it.
Early indications suggest a continuation of existing policies with minor adjustments. Sheinbaum has affirmed the role of the National Guard without suggesting a reversal of its military command structure (Duran, 2025). However, she emphasizes intelligence-driven policing, technological surveillance, and interagency coordination, which could shift focus from large troop deployments to targeted enforcement (Dorantes Galeana, 2024).
Her time as mayor of Mexico City, where certain crime rates decreased through data analysis and interagency cooperation (Zukerman Daly, 2024), might inform her national security strategy. While supporters claim this evidence-based approach has promise, critics argue that the unique conditions of Mexico City do not easily translate to states heavily affected by organized crime (Castillo Jiménez & San Juan Flores, 2025).
Sheinbaum faces significant challenges, as the military holds substantial authority, budgetary independence, and public support. A rollback of its role would require considerable political capital and viable alternatives, which are currently lacking.
Her presidency is a structural test. If militarization continues, Mexico might develop a hybrid governance model in which the military plays a key role in both security and administration. Conversely, if her administration focuses on enhancing civilian policing and judicial effectiveness, it could signal a shift towards stronger rule-of-law institutions.
Why Mexico’s Security Strategy Matters for the Americas
Mexico’s security crisis is linked to U.S.-Mexico drug markets, weapon trafficking, and shared criminal economies, reflecting trends in militarized governance seen in El Salvador and Brazil. Positioned at the center of this system, Mexico’s current stabilized violence showcases a lack of institutional reform, creating an equilibrium among armed actors without addressing root causes.
Eighteen years into Mexico’s war on drugs, the country has not collapsed but struggles with high violence levels and entrenched military governance. Claudia Sheinbaum’s presidency raises questions about shifting towards stronger civilian institutions and governance based on the rule of law.
The direction of Mexico’s security strategy will affect migration, economic relations, and democratic integrity across the Americas. While force may bring temporary stability, lasting peace requires strong institutional foundations, making the next decade crucial for the country’s direction.
The question is not which administration managed violence better, but whether Mexico’s security strategy can move from force-centered governance to institution-centered governance.
Further Reading
For additional analysis on militarization, institutional reform, and regional violence dynamics, readers may also be interested in:
- Militarization, Violence, and Governance in Mexico — A deeper examination of how expanding military roles in public security have reshaped institutional authority in Mexico. The analysis explores the long-term implications of relying on armed forces for civilian governance and complements the discussion of Mexico’s evolving security strategy.
- Police and Corruption in Mexico: Paths and Proposals — An exploration of structural weaknesses in policing and accountability mechanisms, highlighting how corruption and institutional fragility undermine public trust. This piece provides further context for understanding why violence reduction depends on strengthening civilian institutions rather than expanding force.
- Violence in Latin America: Brazil’s Crisis and Regional Dynamics — A regional perspective on rising violence and militarized responses in Latin America. The article situates Mexico’s trajectory within broader hemispheric trends, illustrating how governance challenges transcend national borders.
References
Castillo Jiménez, E., & San Juan Flores, P. (2025, April 23). Los reportes de seguridad de Sheinbaum chocan con la percepción ciudadana: El 70% de los mexicanos se sienten inseguros. El País. https://elpais.com/mexico/2025-04-23/los-reportes-de-seguridad-de-sheinbaum-chocan-con-la-percepcion-ciudadana-el-70-de-los-mexicanos-se-sienten-inseguros.html
Council on Foreign Relations. (2024, August 5). Mexico’s long war: Drugs, crime, and the cartels. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/mexicos-long-war-drugs-crime-and-cartels
Dorantes Galeana, E. (2024, October 9). Claudia Sheinbaum’s security strategy. Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/claudia-sheinbaums-security-strategy
Duran, P. (2025, June 12). Sheinbaum proposes National Guard reform to bolster security. Mexico Business News. https://mexicobusiness.news/policyandeconomy/news/sheinbaum-proposes-national-guard-reform-bolster-security
Flores Martínez, I., & Phillips, M. (2022). The perfect storm. An analysis of the processes that increase lethal violence in Mexico after 2006. Trends in organized crime, 25(1), 58–83. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-021-09410-5
Grayson, G. W. (2012). The impact of President Felipe Calderón’s war on drugs on the armed forces: The prospects for Mexico’s “militarization” and bilateral relations. U.S. Army War College Press. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/533/
Gaussens, P., & González, C. J. (2020). Militarization of public security and violation of human rights in Mexico (2000-2020). The Age of Human Rights Journal, (15), 26-50. https://doi.org/10.17561/tahrj.v15.5783
Hernández, G., & Romero-Arias, C. A. (2019). La Guardia Nacional y la militarización de la seguridad pública en México. URVIO Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad, (25), 87-106. https://doi.org/10.17141/urvio.25.2019.3995
Oropeza Fabián, F. (2025). El origen histórico de la Guardia Nacional en México y su actual enfoque como una fuerza de seguridad pública. ASCE MAGAZINE, 4(4), 2651–2677. https://doi.org/10.70577/asce.v4i4.514
Ramírez, C. (2012). Estrategia de seguridad del presidente Enrique Peña Nieto (Cuadernos de Transición: Documentos). Grupo Transición; Presidencia de la República. https://seguridadydefensa.mx/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/estrategia-seguridad-EPN.pdf
Ramales Osorio, M. C., García Jiménez, R., & Pérez Salmorán, U. (2025). La estrategia de abrazos, no balazos: causas y efectos de la delincuencia en México. Yachana, 14(2). https://doi.org/10.62325/10.62325/yachana.v14.n2.2025.953
Sosa, F. (2025, June 13). Por qué Felipe Calderón comenzó la guerra contra el narcotráfico y cuál fue el impacto social que tuvo. Infobae. https://www.infobae.com/mexico/2025/06/13/por-que-felipe-calderon-comenzo-la-guerra-contra-el-narcotrafico-y-cual-fue-el-impacto-social-que-tuvo/
Zukerman Daly, S. (2024, October 1). Why Sheinbaum may take a different path on Mexico’s security. Americas Quarterly. https://americasquarterly.org/article/why-sheinbaum-may-take-a-different-path-on-mexicos-security/