Violence and crime are not products of chance, but rather the result of various factors that promote it. In Violence and crime are not accidental. They are the product of structural conditions that encourage them. In the Mexican case, militarization and violence in Mexico have become deeply intertwined over the past two decades. This relationship allows us to analyze how security policies, organized crime, and weak institutions interact to intensify violence.
2007: The Beginning of Militarization in Mexico’s War on Drugs
Gradually, the war on drugs in Mexico became central to national security policy. The fight against organized crime began to dominate the government’s agenda.
During the 2006 presidential election, Felipe Calderón emphasized economic priorities. However, once in office, he shifted his rhetoric toward the threat posed by drug cartels. As a result, he promoted a punitive strategy focused on disrupting every stage of the drug trade. To implement this policy, the Mexican military entered public security operations. Authorities described the deployment as temporary but necessary. This moment marked the start of militarization and violence in Mexico.
The government’s direct confrontation with organized crime produced immediate outcomes. Drug seizures increased, and several cartel leaders were arrested. The presence of the state expanded in multiple regions. Nevertheless, the collateral consequences were severe. The most visible effect was the steady rise in homicide rates in Mexico. These increases were driven by territorial disputes among criminal groups and by a broader climate of illegality (INEGI, 2023).
Figure 1. Intentional homicide rates in Mexico since 2006. Prepared with INEGI data
Rather than reducing violence in Mexico, this strategy reinforced lethal dynamics. The same pattern continued under President Enrique Peña Nieto (2012 to 2018), who maintained the militarized model.
In 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador promised to abandon the military approach. Yet his administration expanded military involvement by creating the National Guard in Mexico. Constitutional reforms further strengthened the role of the armed forces in domestic security.
Institutional Factors Behind Militarization and Violence in Mexico
Militarization is not the only cause of violence. However, several institutional factors intensify its effects.
Weak Rule of Law and Civilian Justice Failures
The war on drugs weakened civilian justice institutions. Military priorities displaced long term investments in law enforcement and accountability. Without a strong rule of law in Mexico, militarized strategies fail to dismantle criminal structures. Instead, they perpetuate corruption and bribery throughout the drug trafficking system.
U.S.–Mexico Drug Cooperation and the Fast and Furious Operation
Drug trafficking in Mexico depends heavily on U.S. demand and financial flows. For this reason, the crisis represents a shared responsibility. Cooperation between Mexico and the United States has often lacked coordination. In some cases, it has been openly harmful. One example is Operation Fast and Furious, in which the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives allowed more than 2,500 weapons to enter Mexico in an attempt to trace criminal networks. The operation failed, produced no major arrests, and the weapons later appeared in violent crimes (Department of Justice, 2012).
Addressing Violence in Mexico Beyond Militarization
Reducing militarization and violence in Mexico requires a shift in security policy. A more effective strategy must prioritize institutional strengthening and protect civilian lives. This includes reinforcing judicial systems, combating corruption, and promoting responsible international cooperation. It also demands collaboration among governments, civil society, and academic actors to address the deeper roots of organized crime and violence.
Main Image Source: “Ejercito Mexicano” by Thomas_H_foto – Creative Commons license (CC BY-ND 2.0).
Further Reading
To expand the discussion on militarization and violence in Mexico, as well as the institutional and regional dynamics that shape public security and organized crime across Latin America, readers may also consult:
- Police and Corruption in Mexico: Paths and Proposals — an examination of how institutional weakness and corruption within civilian policing have limited state effectiveness against organized crime.
- Brazil’s Sociopolitical Cataclysm: The Dangers of Unchecked Military Institutions — a comparative analysis of how expanding military influence in domestic governance can threaten democratic stability.
- Violence in Latin America: Brazil’s Crisis — a regional perspective on structural violence that provides comparative context for understanding similar trends in Mexico.
References
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI). (2023). Defunciones por homicidio. https://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/olap/proyectos/bd/continuas/mortalidad/defuncioneshom.asp?s=est
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. (2012, September 20). Statement of Michael E. Horowitz on the review of ATF’s Operation Fast and Furious and related matters. https://www.justice.gov/d9/testimonies/witnesses/attachments/2012/09/20//09-20-12-oig-horowitz-testimony-re-report-by-the-office-of-the-inspector-general.201385143.pdf