Compulsory Voting and the Status Quo: Lessons from Chile’s Constitutional Referendum

Following a mass national protest, Chileans voted strongly in favor of a new constitution in 2020. However, just two years later, when voters were presented with the proposed constitution, the majority rejected it. What changed during those two years?

The narrative surrounding Chile’s unsuccessful constitutional process is often characterized by claims of overreach. Common explanations include a radical constitutional convention, poor drafting of the text, cultural polarization, and a disconnect between activists and “ordinary voters” (Alemán and Navia, 2023). While these reasons have some validity, they may not capture the full picture.

A recent (2025) article in the Bulletin of Latin American Research by Stefano Palestini and Rodrigo Medel offers a different perspective. Instead of focusing solely on the constitutional convention, they raise a more fundamental question: what changes occurred within the electorate?

Their findings indicate that the reasons for the shift in electoral outcomes were not due to ideology, misinformation, or elite sabotage. Instead, they point to a seemingly democratically neutral explanation: compulsory voting.

Compulsory Voting and Changes in the Electorate

Palestini and Medel note that the initial phases of Chile’s constitutional process took place under a voluntary voting system adopted in 2012. While 80 percent of the electorate supported a new constitution, overall turnout was moderate, reflecting primarily the participation of politically engaged individuals, including regular voters, participants in protests, and citizens with sufficient trust in institutions to believe their involvement would make a difference.

However, for the final referendum in 2022, Chile reverted to compulsory voting, a practice in place from the late 1980s until 2012 (Barnes & Rangel, 2014). This shift resulted in an increase of about six million voters. Yet, as the authors point out, this influx was not a neutral addition to the electorate. Many individuals had not participated in elections for years, and some had never cast a ballot before, raising questions about the implications of such a dramatic change in voter turnout.

Political Disengagement and the “Withdrawn Citizen”

Using survey data from 2012 to 2018, before the constitutional process began, the authors identify a stable segment of Chilean society that they refer to as the “withdrawn citizen.” This group is characterized not by ideology or extreme class distinctions, but by a sense of disengagement from the political process.

Withdrawn citizens typically exhibit low interest in politics, minimal participation in elections or protests, and significant distrust of institutions. They are often middle-class, younger, and sufficiently educated to navigate daily life without relying heavily on the state, but they are not necessarily the poorest or richest members of society.

Under a voluntary voting system, many of these individuals chose to stay home on election days. However, under a compulsory voting system, they were required to participate.

The authors make a careful and modest empirical claim: when these previously absent voters entered the electorate in large numbers, it shifted aggregate support away from the constitutional proposal, especially in areas that had experienced low turnout during earlier voluntary voting.

These findings suggest the rejection of the constitution may not necessarily indicate disapproval of its specific provisions. Instead, it may reflect a broader reluctance toward political transformation under conditions of uncertainty.

What Research Says About the Effects of Compulsory Voting

The rules of compulsory voting vary across countries that adopt the practice. In Chile, eligible voters are automatically registered and can face fines if they fail to show up to vote without a valid excuse. Such excuses might include illnesses, being absent from the country or more than 200 km from the polling place at the time of the election, or having some other verifiable impediment (Servel, 2024).

For the 2022 constitutional vote and the recent presidential election in 2025, compulsory voting increased overall participation, with approximately 85% of the electorate casting their votes. 

The case for compulsory voting is often predicated on decreasing turnout, especially in more industrialized countries (Lever, 2010). Those who vote are more likely to be engaged, educated, of higher socioeconomic status, from older generations, and living in urban areas (Keaney & Rogers, 2006). Thus, disadvantaged groups are underrepresented in electoral results, calling into question issues of fairness and legitimacy. 

While research on compulsory voting shows consistent increases in turnout, the effects on political engagement are mixed. In many contexts, citizens comply minimally by showing up, casting blank or invalid ballots, or voting reflexively for the status quo (Singh, 2021). When compulsory voting is abolished, participation rates quickly return to rates seen before the compulsory voting laws were enacted (Gaebler et al, 2020). Thus, even as participation rises, trust and political efficacy do not necessarily follow.

Chile’s case potentially offers a stark version of this dynamic. While compulsory voting laws forced politically withdrawn citizens to make a decision about deep institutional change, many appear to have opted for continuity. This choice may have been fueled less by ideological opposition than by uncertainty about the consequences of change.

This does not mean these voters are irrational or manipulated. It may mean something more mundane and more troubling. They are reasonably content, or at least not discontent enough to risk upheaval.

Political Withdrawal and Status-Quo Preferences

One of the strengths of Palestini and Medel’s analysis is that it avoids making normative claims. Withdrawn citizens are not depicted as reactionary, ignorant, or malicious. Rather, they are individuals who have adapted to the existing system and learned to navigate within it.

This distinction is important because critiques of capitalism, especially when loosely framed as “neoliberalism,” often assume that there is widespread latent dissatisfaction waiting to be mobilized. However, the situation in Chile complicates this assumption. A society can be unequal, fragmented, and institutionally fragile while still having a substantial number of citizens who prefer predictability over transformation, especially when change is complex and uncertain.

From this viewpoint, the failed constitution appears less as a betrayal of democratic aspirations and more as a conflict between mobilized dissatisfaction and entrenched disengagement.

Compulsory Voting, Uncertainty, and Status-Quo Outcomes

Palestini and Medel’s findings suggest that withdrawn citizens tended to favor not changing the constitution. However, the question remains as to why they had this preference. The answer is probably not so simple, and may vary among the politically disengaged.

Political scientists have long noted that abstention is not always apathy. Rational choice models suggest voters weighing the costs and benefits of voting may choose not to participate when they’re unsure which option truly aligns with their interests, effectively preferring non-participation to an uninformed vote (Downs, 1957).

In Chile’s case, uninformed voters did not have the option of non-participation. Research suggests that when voters are poorly informed but compelled to choose, they often default to preserving the status quo rather than risk endorsing an unfamiliar alternative. This logic has been used to explain voting behavior in judicial retention elections, where voters—lacking information about judicial performance or potential replacements—tend to “rubber-stamp” retention as the least risky option (Earley, 2013).

Analyzing Chile’s constitutional referendum reveals a broader trend rather than a unique situation specific to the country. When participation is mandatory and uncertainty is high, a tendency toward status-quo outcomes becomes structurally likely. This phenomenon does not undermine the democratic process, nor does it suggest that voters are irrational. Instead, it highlights how institutional rules shape how preferences are expressed, particularly among those who might otherwise opt out of participation.

The key takeaway is not a judgment on compulsory voting, but an analytical reminder that its behavioral consequences may differ from its normative aspirations. If non-participation can serve as a meaningful response to uncertainty, then mandating participation may systematically change electoral outcomes in ways that are foreseeable yet insufficiently explored. Chile’s case indicates that this dynamic warrants further investigation, especially in high-stakes votes that involve complex and unfamiliar institutional changes. It is crucial to consider these factors when assessing the trade-offs between voluntary and compulsory models of democratic participation.

Further Reading

For broader context on democratic participation, institutional trust, and political disengagement in Latin America, readers may also be interested in:

• The Appearance of Political Polarization in Chile — An examination of how elite conflict and media narratives can exaggerate perceptions of polarization, even in societies where large segments of the population remain politically disengaged. This analysis provides useful context for understanding how electoral outcomes may reflect withdrawal rather than ideological realignment.
• Democracy in Latin America — A regional overview of declining confidence in democratic institutions, highlighting the growing gap between formal participation and substantive political engagement across Latin America. The piece situates cases like Chile within broader trends of institutional skepticism and uneven democratic legitimacy.
• Political Decentralization in Colombia — A case study of how institutional design and governance reforms are experienced at the local level, illustrating how citizens may adapt to political systems without actively participating in or contesting them. The analysis complements discussions of disengagement by showing how everyday governance shapes political expectations.

References

Alemán, E., & Navia, P. (2023). Chile’s failed constitution: Democracy wins. Journal of Democracy, 34(2), 90-104. https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/886935/summary

Barnes, T. D., & Rangel, G. (2014). Election law reform in Chile: The implementation of automatic registration and voluntary voting. Election Law Journal, 13(4), 570-582. https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2013.0205

Contreras, G., & Morales, M. (2024). Masking turnout inequality. Invalid voting and class bias when compulsory voting is reinstated. Electoral Studies, 92, 102878. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2024.102878

Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. Harper & Row.

Earley, D. W. (2013). When bathtub crocodiles attack: The timing and propriety of campaigning by judicial retention election candidates. NYU Annual Survey of American Law, 68(239), 239-288. https://annualsurveyofamericanlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/68-2_earley.pdf

Gaebler, S., Potrafke, N., & Roesel, F. (2020). Compulsory voting and political participation: Empirical evidence from Austria. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 81, 103499. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2019.103499

Keaney, E., & Rogers, B. (2006). A citizen’s duty: Voter inequality and the case for compulsory turnout. Institute for Public Policy Research. https://ippr-org.files.svdcdn.com/production/Downloads/a_citizens_duty_1504.pdf

Lever, A. (2010). Compulsory voting: A critical perspective. British Journal of Political Science, 40(4), 897-915. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40930591

Palestini, S., & Medel, R. M. (2026). The ‘Withdrawn Citizen’: Making Sense of the Failed Constitutional Process in Chile. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 45(1), e70019. https://doi.org/10.1111/blar.70019

Servicio Electoral de Chile. (2024, October 24). ¿Me puedo excusar por no ir a votar? https://www.servel.cl/2024/10/24/me-puedo-excusar-por-no-ir-a-votar/

Singh, S. P. (2021). The consequences of compulsory voting. In Beyond turnout: How compulsory voting shapes citizens and political parties (pp. 38–56). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198832928.003.0002